Mechanism of Homomorphic Encryptions (Algorithmic and Computational Theory in Algebra and Languages) by Yamamura, Akihiro
Title Mechanism of Homomorphic Encryptions (Algorithmic andComputational Theory in Algebra and Languages)
Author(s)Yamamura, Akihiro




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Mechanism of Homomorphic Encryptions *
Akihiro Yamamura
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Akita University
1-1, Tegata gakuen-machi, Akita-shi, Akita 010-8502, Japan
email: yamamura@ie.akita-u.ac.jp
Abstract
We study mechanism, design principles, generalization and applications of homomorphic
encryptions. Our method is based on the terminology of basic group theory and nicely covers
the mechanism and the security of many homomorphic encryptions.
1 Introduction
A mapping between algebraic systems is called a homomorphism if it preserves the algebraic struc-
tures. In cryptography, a trapdoor one-way homomorphism between cyclic groups have been studied
and applied to many cryptographic protocols. Such encryptions include ElGamal, Goldwasser-
Micali, Paillier, Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystems and so on [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Homomorphic en-
cryptions share many similarities, however, no uniform mechanism has been presented so far. In
this paper, we study homomorphic encryptions from the standpoint of group theory, in particular,
we use split exact sequences and the subgroup membership problem to explain the mechanism,
constructions and the indistinguishability of homomorphic encryptions.
Our contribution in this paper is to explain the mechanism of homomorphic encryptions using
uniform design via exact sequences and the subgroup membership problem. This is presented in
Yamamura[7] and security discussions are given in [6, 8, 9]. This approach simplifies the mechanism
of numerous homomorphic encryptions and enable us to explain functionality of homomorphic
encryptions in a mathematically sound way.
2 Mechanism of Homomorphic Encryptions
We describe the mechanism of homomorphic encryption functions. First, we recall that a sequence
of homomorphisms $1arrow Harrow^{\delta}Garrow^{d}Parrow 1$ is called exact if the kemel $Kerd$ coincides with
the image ${\rm Im}\delta$ . Following the mathematical convention, 1” stands for the trivial subgroup {1}. If
the group operation is additive, we may denote it by $0$ . Note that $\delta:Harrow G$ is an embedding and
$Garrow P$ is surjective. Furthermore, if there exists a homomorphism $\epsilon$ : $Parrow G$ such that $do\epsilon$ is the
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identity mapping of $P$ , then we say that the exact sequence splits. In such a case, $G$ is isomorphic
to a semidirect product of $H$ by $P$ .
Let $k$ be the security parameter. For the input $1^{k}$ , a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
$\mathcal{I}\mathcal{G}$ , called an instanoe generator, outputs the description of a finite group $P$ , the description of
a finite group $G$ , the description of a subgroup $H$ of $G$ , the couple of public and private keys,
and the description of a probabilistic algorithm SAM, called a sampling algorithm, that chooses
randomly and uniformly an element of $H$ . Elements in $G$ and $P$ are represented by binary strings
and operations in the groups, multiplication and taking inverses, are efficiently computable. The
subgroup $H$ is called the subgroup of randomizers. The group $P$ is called the group of plaintexts.
The encoder $\epsilon$ is an isomorphism of $P$ into $G$ , and there is an algorithm to compute $\epsilon$ efficiently with
the public key. The decryption function $d$ is a homomorphism of $G$ onto $P$ such that do $\epsilon=id_{P}$ and
its kemel $Kerd$ coincides with $H$ . FUrthermore, $d$ is efficiently computable with the private key.
In such a case, by the basic algebra, we have a split exact sequence $1arrow Harrow^{\delta}Garrow\wedge\epsilon Parrow 1$ .
Then $G=H\epsilon(P)$ and $H\cap\epsilon(P)=1$ . This implies that $G$ is a semidirect product of $H$ and $\epsilon(P)$ .
Furthermore, $G=\epsilon(P)\cross H\cong PxH$ and $P\cong G/H$ and $\epsilon(P)$ is the set of representatives of $H$ in
$G$ , that is, $G=\epsilon(m_{0})H\cup\epsilon(m_{1})H\cup\cdots\cup\epsilon(m_{n})H$ , where $P=\{m_{0}, m_{1}, \ldots, m_{n}\}$ (if $P$ is finite).
Encryption: The encryption function $e$ is computed by
$e(m)=\epsilon(m)r$ , (2.1)
where $r$ is an output of $S\mathcal{A}\mathcal{M}$ and $m$ is a plaintext in $P$ . We note that each coset $\epsilon(m)H$ is the set
of ciphertexts of the plaintext $m$ . This means that $e$ can be considered a probabilistic algorithm
choosing an element randomly and uniformly from $\epsilon(m)H$ for each plaintext $m\in P$ .
Decryption: The decryption is done just by computing $d$ provided the private key (secret infor-
mation) is given. Since $Kerd$ coincides with $H$ and $d\circ\epsilon=id_{P}$ , we have $d(e(m)).=d(\epsilon(m)r)=$
$d(\epsilon(m))d(r)=id_{P}(m)=m$ for every ciphertext $m\in P$ . Hence, $d$ decrypts the ciphertext $e(m)$ .
Note that we need the private key to compute $d$ .
Assumption:
Let $G$ be a group, and let $H$ be its subgroup. The membership problem is to decide whether
or not a given element $g$ in $G$ belongs to $H$ . Furthermore, we consider a family of finite groups
indexed by a parameter and the asymptotic behavior according to computation. In such a case, the
subgroup membership is described as a computation problem to decide the membership when given
an element, a subgroup and a group indexed by a parameter. A computation problem is hard if no
efficient algorithms. The efficiency is characterized by the asymptotic behavior of an algorithm.
We suppose that every element in $G$ has a binary representation of size $k$ , where $k$ is the security
parameter. The membership can be decided within polynomial time in $k$ if a certain information,
called a trapdoor, is provided. The membership of an element $g$ in $G$ in $H$ can be decided provided
the trapdoor, however, the membership cannot be decided with a probability substantially larger
than one half without the trapdoor. We now formalize the subgroup membership problem.
Let $k$ be the security parameter. For the input $1^{k}$ , a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
$\mathcal{I}\mathcal{G}$ outputs the description of a group $G$ , the description of a subgroup $H$ of $G$ and the trapdoor
that provides a polynomial time algorithm for the subgroup membership problem of $H$ in $G$ . The
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algorithm $\mathcal{I}\mathcal{G}$ is called the instance genemtor. Every element of $G$ is represented as a binary
sequence of length $k$ . Computation of the multiplication in $G$ is performed in polynomial time in
$k$ .
The predicate for the membership of a subgroup is denoted by Mem, that is, Mem is defined as
follows.
Mem$(G, H, x)=\{\begin{array}{l}1 if x lies in H0 if x lies in S,\end{array}$
where $\mathcal{I}\mathcal{G}$ outputs the pair $(G, H)$ for $1^{k},$ $x$ is in $G$ , and $S=G\backslash H$ . The subgroup membership
problem is to compute Mem in polynomial time in $k$ when we inputs $1^{k}$ and obtain a pair of groups
$(G, H)$ and an element $g$ in $G$ , which is uniformly and randomly chosen ffom $H$ or $G$ according
to the coin toss $barrow R\{0,1\}$ . If there does not exist a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that
computes Mem with a probability substantially larger than -, then we say that the membership
problem is intmctable.
It is shown in [9] that the quadratic residue problem and the decision Diffie-Hellman problem
can be characterized as a subgroup membership problem. We briefly review these two problems.
Quadratic Residue Problem: Let $p,$ $q$ be primes. Set $N=pq$. The primes $p$ and $q$ are
trapdoor information for the quadratic residue problem, on the other hand, the integer $N$ is a
public information. Let $G$ be the subgroup of $(\mathbb{Z}/(N))^{*}$ consisting of the elements whose Jacobi
symbol is 1, and let $H$ be the subgroup of $G$ consisting of quadratic residues of $G$ , that is, $H=$
$\{x\in G|x=y^{2}mod N$ for $y\in(\mathbb{Z}/(N))^{*}\}$ . The quadratic residue problem (QR for short) of
$H$ in $G$ is to decide whether or not, a given element $g\in G,$ $g$ belongs to $H$ . We can effectively
determine the membership of $g$ in $H$ provided that the information $p$ and $q$ are available. No
polynomial time algorithm is known for the membership of a randomly chosen element of $G$ in $H$
without the information $p$ and $q$ . Hence, if we define an instance generator for the QR problem
as a probabilistic algorithm that outputs two primes $p$ and $q$ of size $k$ and a quadratic non-residue
$h$ whose Jacobi symbol is 1 for the input $1^{k}$ , then the QR problem is considered as a subgroup
membership problem.
Decision DiMe-Hellman Problem: Let $C$ be a cyclic group of prime order $p$. Let $g$ be a
generator of $C$ . The decision Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH for short) is to decide whether or not
$h_{2}=g_{2}^{a}$ for the given quadruple $(g1, h_{1}, g2, h_{2})$ of elements in $C$ with $h_{1}=g_{1}^{a}$ for some $1\leq a\leq p-1$ .
If so, we say that $(g1, h_{1g2}, h_{2})$ is a Diffie-Hellman quadruple. The integer $a$ is the trapdoor of the
DDH problem. Knowing the trapdoor $a$ , we can efficiently decide whether or not $h_{2}=g_{2}^{a}$ . Now
we set $G$ to be the direct product $C\cross C$ . Then the input to the DDH problem is $(x, y)$ where
$x,$ $y\in G$ , that is, $x=(g1, h_{1})$ and $y=(g2, h_{2})$ . It is obvious that $(g1, h_{1}, g2, h_{2})$ is a DiffieHellman
quadrupIe if and only if $y$ belongs to the subgroup $<x>$ of $G$ generated by $x$ . It follows that
the DDH problem for the cyclic group $C$ is equivalent to the subgroup membership problem of the
group $H=<x>$ , where $x=(g1, g_{1}^{a})$ , in the group $G=C\cross C=<gi>\cross<g1>$ .
Homomorphic Property: For any ciphertexts $c_{1}=\epsilon(m_{1})r_{1}$ and $c_{2}=\epsilon(m_{2})r_{2}$ , where $r_{1,2}r$ are
outputs of $S\mathcal{A}\mathcal{M}$ and $m_{1},$ $m_{2}$ are plaintexts in $P$ , we have $c_{1}c_{2}=\epsilon(m_{1})r_{1}\epsilon(m_{2})r_{2}=\epsilon(m_{1}m_{2})r_{1}r_{2}$
since $\epsilon$ is a homomorphism. Note also that $r_{1}r_{2}\in H$ . Therefore, $c_{1}c_{2}$ belongs to $\epsilon(m_{1}m_{2})H$ and it
is a ciphertext of $m_{1}m_{2}$ . Thus the encryption function $e$ is homomorphic. In the language of group
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theory, the homomorphic property is a natural consequence of the quotient group $G/H$ forms a
group. that is, $c_{1}Hc_{2}H=c_{1}c_{2}H$ for all cosets $c_{1}H,$ $c_{2}H$ .
We summarize the mechanism of a homomorphic encryption in Fig. 1. The decryption $d$ can







1 $H$ – $G$ $\underline{d}$ $P$ 1
Figure 1: Exact Sequence and Mechanism of Homomorphic Encryption
ElGamal Encryption: Let $C=\langle g\rangle$ be a cyclic group of prime order $p$ . Let $P=C$ and $G=$
$C\cross C$ . The encoder $\epsilon$ is defined to be the function $marrow(1, m)\in G$ . It is clear that $\epsilon$ is an
isomorphism of $P$ into $G$ . Suppose that the public key for the ElGamal encryption is $(g,g^{b})$ , where
$b$ is uniformly and randomly chosen. Let $H=\langle(g,g^{b})\rangle$ the subgroup of $G$ generated by the element
$(g, g^{b})$ . We note that $\epsilon(P)\cap H=1$ and $G=\epsilon(P)H$ . Recall that a ciphertext of $m\in P$ is
$e(m)=(g^{a},g^{ab}m)=(1, m)(g,g^{b})^{a}=\epsilon(m)r$ , where $r=(g,g^{b})^{a}$ is randomly and uniformly chosen
from the subgroup $H$ of randomizers, that is, $a$ is randomly chosen, and $e(m)$ belongs to $\epsilon(m)H$ .
Since $\epsilon$ is an isomorphism, the encryption is homomorphic, that is, $e(m_{1}m2)=e(m_{1})e(m_{2})$ , or
$\epsilon(m_{1}m_{2})H=\epsilon(m_{1})H\epsilon(m_{2})H$ . The decryption $d:Garrow P$ is defined by $(g^{x},g^{y})arrow g^{-xb}g^{y}$ . Clearly
$d$ is a homomorphism. Moreover, it is easy to see that $Kerd$ is $H$ and $d\circ\epsilon=idp$ . Hence, we have
the split exact sequence $1arrow\langle(g,g^{b})\ranglearrow C\cross Carrow C\wedge\epsilonarrow 1$. We recall that the semantic security
of the ElGamal is equivalent to the DDH problem [6].
Goldwasser-Micali Encryption: Let $G$ be the subgroup of $(\mathbb{Z}/(N))^{*}$ , where $N=pq$ , consisting
of the elements whose Jacobi symbol is 1, and $H$ be the subgroup of $G$ consisting of quadratic
residues of $G$ . Goldwasser-Micali encryption [2] is characterized as follows. Let $P$ be the cyclic
group of order two, that is, $(\mathbb{Z}/2, +)$ . The encoder $\epsilon$ : $Parrow G$ is defined by $marrow g^{m}$ , where $g$ is an
element of $G\backslash H$ and the public key. The decryption $d$ : $Garrow P$ is defined by $d(x)=0$ if $x\in H$
and $d(x)=1$ otherwise. The message $m\in P$ is encrypted to be $e(m)=g^{m}r=\epsilon(m)r$ , where $r$ is
uniformly and randomly chosen ffom $H$ . Clearly $d$ is a homomorphism. Moreover, evidently $Kerd$
is $H$ and $do\epsilon=id_{P}$ . Hence, we have the split exact sequence $1arrow G^{2}arrow Garrow\wedge\epsilon(\mathbb{Z}/2, +)arrow 0$.
We recall that the semantic security of the Goldwasser-Micali is equivalent to the quadratic residue
problem $[2|$ .
Benaloh encryption: Let $p,q$ be two distinct primes. Set $N=pq$ . Let $n$ be a prime such that
$n|\phi(N)(=(p-1)(q-1))$ and $n$ and $\phi(N)/n$ are coprime. Set $G=(\mathbb{Z}/(N))^{*},$ $H=\{x^{n}|x\in G\}$
and $P=(\mathbb{Z}/(n), +)$ . Choose $g\in G\backslash H$ . The message $m\in P$ is encrypted to be $e(m)=\epsilon(m)r=$
$g^{m}rmod N$ , where $r$ is uniformly and randomly chosen from $H$ . For $w\in G$ , the class of $w$ ,
denoted by $[wIg$ ’ is defined by the unique integer $x\in P$ for which there exists $y\in H$ such that
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$g^{x}y\equiv wmod N$ . The decryption function $d$ : $Garrow P$ is defined by $w\mapsto[wI_{g}\cdot$ Clearly $d$ is a
homomorphism. Moreover, $kerd=H$ and $d\circ\epsilon=id_{P}$ . Hence, we have the split exact sequence
$1arrow G^{n}arrow Garrow P\wedge\not\inarrow 0$ .
We recall that the semantic security of the Benaloh is equivalent to the the prime residuosity
problem [1].
Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption: Let $p,q$ be odd primes such that $|p|=|q|=k$ . Set $n=$
$p^{2}q(|n|=3k)$ and $G=(\mathbb{Z}/(n))^{*}$ . Let $\Gamma_{p}$ be the p-Sylow subgroup of G. A group homomorphism
$L_{p}$ of $\Gamma_{p}$ into the additive group $(\mathbb{Z}/(p), +)$ is defined by $L_{p}(x)=(x-1)/p$ . Choose $g\in G$
randomly such that the order of $(g^{\rho-1}mod p^{2})$ is $p$. Let $h=g^{n}mod n$ . Set $H=\{x^{n}|x\in G\}$ and
$P=(\mathbb{Z}/(2^{k-1}), +)$ . The encoder $\epsilon$ : $Parrow G$ is defined by $marrow g^{m}mod n$ . The message $m\in P$ is
encrypted to be $e(m)=\epsilon(m)r=g^{m}rmod n$ , where $r$ is uniformly and randomly chosen ffom $H$ .
The decryption function $d:Garrow P$ is defined by $d(x)=L_{p}(x^{p-1}mod p^{2})/L_{p}(g^{p-1}mod p^{2})mod p$.
Clearly $d$ is a homomorphism. Moreover, $kerd=H$ and $d\circ\epsilon=id_{P}$ . Hence, we have the split exact
sequence
$1arrow G^{n}arrow Garrow P\wedge\epsilonarrow 0$ .
Paillier encryption: Let $p,$ $q$ be odd primes. Set $n=pq$ and $G=(\mathbb{Z}/(n^{2}))^{*},$ $H=$ {n-th residues $\in$
$G\}$ and $P=(\mathbb{Z}/(n), +)$ . order $\phi(n^{2})=n\phi(n)$ . distinguishing n-th intractability hypothesis For
$g\in G,$ $\mathcal{E}_{9}$ : $P\cross(\mathbb{Z}/(n))^{*}arrow G$ is defined by $(x, y)\mapsto g^{x}y^{n}mod n^{2}$ . $\mathcal{E}_{g}$ is bijective if the order of $g$ is
a nonzero multiple of $n$ . The set of the elements whose order is a nonzero multiple of $n$ is denoted
by $\mathcal{B}(\subset G)$ . For $g\in \mathcal{B}$ and $w\in G$ , the class of $w$ , denoted by $[wI_{9}$ , is defined by the unique integer
$x\in \mathbb{Z}/(n)$ for which there exists $y\in(\mathbb{Z}/(n))^{*}$ such that $\mathcal{E}_{g}(x, y)=w$ . For $g\in \mathcal{B}$ , the class function
$w\mapsto[wI_{9}$ is a homomorphism from $G$ to $(\mathbb{Z}/(n), +)$ . Set $S_{n}=\{u<n^{2}|u\equiv 1mod n\}$ . The function
$L$ on $S_{n}$ is defined by $L(u)=(u-1)/n$ . Choose a base $g\in \mathcal{B}$ randomly. The encoder $\epsilon$ : $Parrow G$ is
defined by $m\mapsto g^{m}mod n^{2}$ , The message $m\in P$ is encrypted to be $e(m)=\epsilon(m)r=g^{m}rmod n^{2}$ ,
where $r$ is uniformly and randomly chosen ffom $H$ . The decryption function $d:Garrow P$ is defined
by $d(x)=L(x^{\lambda}mod n^{2})/L(g^{\lambda}mod n^{2})mod n$ . Clearly $d$ is a homomorphism. Moreover, $kerd=H$
and $d\circ\epsilon=id_{P}$ . Hence, we have the split exact sequence
$1arrow G^{n}arrow Garrow P\wedge\epsilonarrow 0$.
It is shown in [5] that the the encryption scheme is semantically secure if and only if the Decisional
Composite Residuosity Assumption is intractable.
Naccache-Stern encryption: Let $\sigma$ be a square-hee odd B-smooth integer, where $B$ is a small
integer and let $n$ be a product of two distinct primes $p,$ $q$ such that $\sigma|\phi(n)$ and $\sigma$ and $\phi(n)/\sigma$ are
coprime. Let $g$ be an element whose multiplicative order modulo $n$ is a large multiple of $\sigma$ . Set
$G=<g>,$ $H=\{x^{\sigma}|x\in \mathbb{Z}/(n)\}$ and $P=(\mathbb{Z}/(\sigma), +)$ . The message $m\in P$ is encrypted to be
$e(m)=\epsilon(m)r=g^{m}rmod n$ , where $r$ is uniformly and randomly chosen $homH$. The decryption
function $d:Garrow P$ is performed using the prime factors of $\sigma$ and the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
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Clearly $d$ is a homomorphism. Moreover, $kerd=<g^{\sigma}>$ and $d\circ\epsilon=id_{P}$ . Hence, we have the split
exact sequence
$1arrow\Gamma_{\vee}^{v\sigma}arrow Garrow P\wedge\not\inarrow 0$ .
We recall that the semantic security of the Naccache-Stem is equivalent to the the prime residuosity
problem [3].
The textbook RSA has the homomorphic property, that is, $e(m_{1}m_{2})=(m_{1}m_{2})^{e}=m_{1}^{e}m_{2}^{e}=$
$e(m_{1})e(m_{2})$ . In this case, the space of plaintexts does not form a group unless the user restricts
the domain of the plaintexts to $(\mathbb{Z}/n)^{*}$ . Instead, usually the domain of the plaintexts is just the
semigroup $\mathbb{Z}/n$ . Thus, the textbook RSA is not characterized as the scheme above.
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